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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
meruit. The doctrine of the Selle case and the holding of the instant case
provoke a fundamental question: Why should specific performance be
granted generally when the consideration given by the promisee was per-
sonal services, but denied when the promisee has merely paid money? 9
The object of the court in both types of cases is to make whole the
promisee. When money has been paid, that object can be attained by a
recovery for money had and received, and there is no need to enforce the
oral contract in the face of the statute of frauds. So, too, when services
can be compensated accurately by payment of money, as in the Selle case,
a recovery in quantum meruit is adequate. The test should be nothing so
mechanical as the relative duration of the services, nor their relative ardu-
ousness, though these may be pertinent factors. The question should be:
Are the services of such a sort that they can be computed with comparative
accuracy in terms of dollars and cents? If so, the statute should be given
effect and specific performance denied. When, however, as in the principal
case, an attempt to evaluate the services would force the court to weigh
imponderables, quantum meruit would be at best an inaccurate remedy. In
such a case, assuming that the contract has been properly proved, the
statute should be disregarded and specific performance granted.1o
W. L. P.
INSURANCE--ASSIGNMENT TO ONE WITHOUT AN INSURABLE INTEREST-
EXTENT OF REcovERY-[Pennsylvania].-Four policies of insurance were
issued by the defendant company on the life of the deceased, payable to his
estate. Each policy was subsequently assigned to the plaintiff, who had no
insurable interest in the life of the deceased. It does not appear whether
the intent to assign was conceived before the policies were issued to the
deceased. Held: The assignment of an insurance policy to one who has no
insurable interest, whether in good faith or not, is as contrary to public
policy as the original issuance of a policy to such a person, and the assignee
may recover only the amount expended by him in keeping the policy alive.
Werenzinski v. Prudential Insurance Co.1
In limiting the assignee's recovery to the amount paid out by him in
keeping the policy in force, even where there was no antecedent agreement
to assign, the instant case represents the minority rule.2 The cases follow-
ing this rule are founded chiefly on the language of Mr. Justice Field of
the United States Supreme Court in Warnock v. Davis: "The assignment
of a policy to a party not having an insurable interest is as objectionable
as the taking out of a policy in his name."3 The holding of the Warnock
9. See Wheeler v. Dake (1908) 129 Mo. App. 547, 107 S. W. 1105; 2
Williston, Contracts (2d ed. 1936) 1432, sec. 494.
10. For a similar view see Note (1930) 19 Ky. L. J. 69.
1. (Pa. 1940) 14 A. (2d) 279.
2. Downey v. Hoffer (1885) 110 Pa. 109, 20 At. 655; Taussig v. United
Security Life Ins. and Trust Co. (1911) 231 Pa. 16, 79 At. 810.
3. Warnock v. Davis (1881) 104 U. S. 775, 779.
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case was later limited by the Court in Grigsby v. Russell 4 to instances in
which the agreement to assign '&as antecedent to the issuance of the policy.
An assignment under the latter circumstances is regarded as a mere subter-
fuge to enable one having no insurable interest to obtain by indirection a
policy on the life of the insured. On the other hand, when there is no
antecedent agreement, the insured is the principal actor in the procuring
of the policy, and his purpose is merely to aid one whom he deems a proper
object of his bounty.5 Under such circumstances the majority rule is that
the assignee may recover and retain the entire proceeds of the policy.0
The principal case is in line with previous decisions of the Pennsylvania
court.7 These cases, however, were decided before Grigsby V. Russell limited
the operation of Warnock v. Davis to a set of facts in which there was an
antecedent agreement to assign. Since the Grigsby case, one Pennsylvania
case, by way of dictum, indicated that the validity of assignments did not
depend upon the question of an antecedent agreement.8 Another case, how-
ever, suggested that perhaps the Grigsby case, which limited the Warnock
case, also limited the Pennsylvania decisions based on the earlier case.0
The principal case resolves this conflict in favor of the minority rule.
In Missouri the only decision directly in point was in favor of the as-
signee. 0 The policy in that case was issued without an antecedent agree-
ment to assign, but the court did not consider the conflicting rules. It is
interesting to note that although this case was decided prior to the Grigsby
case and subsequent to the Wa'nock case, the opinion does not refer to
Warnock v. Davis. Missouri cases subsequent to the Grigsby case have
never decided whether the existence of an antecedent agreement would
make any difference. The court has said that an assignment to one who
has no insurable interest in the life of the insured is prima facie voidable
as to sums in excess of the advances made, 1 and that the assignment of a
life policy to one who has no insurable interest is voidable as falling within
the rule against wagering policies. 1 2 The Missouri courts, however, have
also assumed arguendo that the assignment is valid, if there was no ante-
cedent agreement.1 3
The minority rule is based on the argument that the holder of an as-
signed policy, even when there is no antecedent agreement to assign, may
be more interested in the death than in the life of the party assured, if
he has no insurable interest.4 A denial of recovery is in accord with the
general policy of the law that forbids speculative contracts upon human
4. Grigsby v. Russell (1911) 222 U. S. 149.
5. Patterson, Insurable Interests in Life Contracts (1918) 18 Col. L.
Rev. 381, 396.
6. Grigsby v. Russell (1911) 222 U. S. 775.
7. See cases cited supra note 2.
8. Steen v. Lowry (1925) 85 Pa. Sup. 365.
9. Young v. Hipple (1922) 273 Pa. 439, 117 Atl. 185, 25 A. L. R. 1541.
10. MacFarland v. Creath (1889) 35 Mo. App. 112.
11. Locke v. Bowman (1912) 168 Mo. App. 121, 151 S. W. 468.
12. Tripp v. Jordon (1914) 177 Mo. App. 339, 164 S. W. 158.
13. Ibid.
14. Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Hazzard (1872) 41 Ind. 116.
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life.'5 The majority rule, on the other hand, recognizes the practical con-
venience of giving to life policies some characteristics of property.16 It also
recognizes the fact that assignments are generally made to a "roughly
selected class of people, who by their general relations with the person
whose life is insured, are less likely than criminals at large to attempt to
compass his death."'1 It has been suggested that this statement of Mr.
Justice Holmes be limited to situations in which the person whose life is
insured consents to the assignment and then only when the consent is a
"real and an intelligent consent."'1 8  S. F.
LABOR-FAIR LABOR STANDARDS AcT-TPS AS WAGEs-[Federal].-
Plaintiff, as a representative of defendant's "redcap" employees, sued for
minimum wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.' Defendant had
offered to pay the difference between tips actually received and the mini-
nmum wages required under the Act. Held: Tips cannot be regarded as part
of the minimum wages prescribed under the Act; the defendant was liable
for the prescribed wages without deduction for tips. Pickett V. Union
Terminal Co.2
There seem to be several possible bases for this decision, which is the
first to hold that under the Fair Labor Standards Act tips are not a part
of wages. The court relied to some extent upon two earlier decisions hold-
ing that tips belong to the employee, not to the employer.3 These cases were
suits by shoe-shine boys to recover tips which they had paid over to their
employers. The court in the instant case found in the supposed Congres-
sional intent underlying the Fair Labor Standards Act a basis for inter-
preting the word "wages" strictly.4 This construction is supported by the
court's view that tips are a gratuity rather than wages, and also by the
fact that the Act uses the mandatory phrase "shall pay" in describing the
duty of the employer.5 In reaching its result the court refused to follow
15. Warnock v. Davis (1881) 104 U. S. 775.
16. Grigsby v. Russell (1911) 222 U. S. 149; St. John v. American Mut.
Ins. Co. (1885) 13 N. Y. 31.
17. Grigsby v. Russell (1911) 222 U. S. 149, 155.
18. Patterson, supra note 5, at 392.
1. Fair Labor Standards Act (1938) 52 Stat. 1060, c. 676, 29 U. S. C. A.
(Supp. 1939) sec. 201.
2. (D. C. N. D. Tex. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 244.
3. Zappas v. Roumeliote (1912) 156 Iowa 709, 137 N. W. 935; Polites v.
Barlin (1912) 149 Ky. 376, 149 S W. 828, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1217. See
Manubens v. Leon (1918) 1 K. B. 208, in which tips were included in
damages for wrongful discharge.
4. Fair Labor Standards Act (1938) 52 Stat. 1060, c. 676, 29 U. S. C. A.(Supp. 1939) sec. 203(m). "'Wage' paid to any employee includes the
reasonable cost, as determined by the administrator, to the employer of
furnishing such employee with board, lodging, or other facilities, if such
board, lodging or other facilities are customarily furnished by such em-
ployer to his employees."
5. Fair Labor Standards Act (1938) 52 Stat. 1060, c. 676, sec. 6, 29
U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1939) sec. 206.
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